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Propositional dynamic logic with
Belnapian truth values
Igor Sedla´r∗1
1Institute of Computer Science, The Czech Academy of Sciences, Pod
Voda´renskou veˇzˇ´ı 271/2, 182 07 Prague 8, Czech Republic
Abstract. We introduce BPDL, a combination of propositional dynamic logic
PDL with the basic four-valued modal logic BK studied by Odintsov and Wansing
(‘Modal logics with Belnapian truth values’, J. Appl. Non-Class. Log. 20, 279–301
(2010)). We modify the standard arguments based on canonical models and filtra-
tion to suit the four-valued context and prove weak completeness and decidability
of BPDL.
Keywords. Belnap–Dunn logic, Four-valued logic, Propositional dynamic logic.
1 Introduction
Propositional dynamic logic PDL is a well-known logical framework that
allows to express properties of regular programs and formalises reasoning
about these properties [8, 15]. The framework sees programs as state transi-
tions, or binary relations on states, where states of the computer are viewed
as complete and consistent possible worlds. A more general notion of com-
puter state has been put forward by Belnap and Dunn [5, 4, 6]. In a possible
world, every formula is either true or false. In a Belnap–Dunn state, for-
mulas can be (only) true, (only) false, both true and false, or neither true
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nor false. Informally, Belnap–Dunn states are seen as bodies of information
about some domain and the four truth values correspond to presence or
absence of information about the domain. More precisely, the four possible
truth values of a formula φ express four possible answers to the query ‘What
is the available information about φ?’, namely:
• there is information that φ is true and no information that φ is false
(‘true’);
• there is information that φ is false and no information that φ is true
(‘false’);
• there is information that φ is true but also information that φ is false
(‘both’);
• there is no information about φ (‘neither’).
Belnap and Dunn stress the importance of this generalisation to computer
science, pointing mainly to databases as a potential area of application.
Later work on bilattices, a generalisation of the Belnap–Dunn notion of
state, has confirmed their assessment and extended the applications to other
areas [12, 11, 1, 9, 10].
Putting things together, a version of PDL using Belnap–Dunn states
would formalise reasoning about regular programs that modify (possibly in-
complete and inconsistent) database-like structures. Such structures abound
and a logical formalisation of reasoning about their algorithmic transforma-
tions could be of vital importance to AI and related areas. In addition to
practical applications, theoretical questions pertaining to the properties of
such generalised versions of PDL are interesting in their own right. How-
ever, Belnap–Dunn versions of PDL are yet to be investigated.
This article fills the gap. We discuss BPDL, a logic that adds program
modalities to Odintsov and Wansing’s [16] basic modal logic with Belnapian
truth values BK (see also [17, 18]). Our main technical results concern-
ing BPDL (introduced in Section 3 of the article) are a decidability proof
using a variation of the standard argument based on filtration (Section 4)
and a sound and weakly complete axiomatisation (Section 5). We assume
familiarity with PDL, but a short overview of BK is provided in Section 2.
We note that there are other well-known four-valued modal logics, but
there are reasons to favour BK when it comes to combinations with PDL.
Priest’s basic modal First-Degree-Entailment KFDE [19] lacks a sensible
implication connective (e.g., Modus ponens fails), which is a problem given
the importance of implication in stating properties of programs such as
partial correctness. Goble’s KN4 [13] corresponds to a fragment of BK.
The framework of Rivieccio, Jung and Jansana [20] is more complicated than
BK in that it treats the modal accessibility relation itself as many-valued.
As a result, for instance, the familiar ‘K axiom’ (φ → ψ) → (φ → ψ)
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is not valid. This is problematic from the viewpoint of PDL which is a
normal modal logic. (However, a non-normal version of PDL built on this
framework might still be interesting to look at in the future.) Another
approach is to add to PDL a modal DeMorgan negation in the style of
[7]. However, the modal negation in this framework does not fit in with
implication as nicely as the negation inBK (for instance, ∼(φ→ ψ) does not
entail φ, where ‘∼’ is the DeMorgan negation). Nevertheless, this approach
is pursued by the present author in [21].
The general idea of providing many-valued versions of PDL is not new.
Teheux [22] formulates PDL over finitely-valued  Lukasiewicz logics to model
the Re´nyi–Ulam searching game with errors. However, the non-modal frag-
ments of his logics are non-classical, as opposed to BK which can be seen
as an extension of the classically-based logic K with a strong negation.
Beˇhounek [2, 3] suggests that PDL with fuzzy accessibility relations is suit-
able for reasoning about costs of program executions, but the states in his
models remain classical.
2 Modal logic with Belnapian truth values
This section provides background on BK and motivates our extension of
the logic with program modalities. The language Lmod consists of AF , a
countable set of atomic formulas, a nullary connective ⊥, unary connectives
∼,,♦ and binary connectives ∧,∨,→. ¬φ is defined as φ → ⊥, ⊤ is
defined as ¬⊥ and φ↔ ψ is defined as (φ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → φ). Fmod is the set
of formulas of Lmod.
Definition 2.1. [16, 285–286] An Odintsov–Wansing model is a tuple M =
〈S,R, V +, V −〉 where S 6= ∅, R ⊆ (S × S) and V ◦ : AF 7→ 2S, ◦ = {+,−}.
Every M induces a pair of relations |=+M , |=
−
M ⊆ (S × Fmod) such that (we
usually drop the subscript ‘M ’):
1. x |=+ p iff x ∈ V +(p); x |=− p iff x ∈ V −(p)
2. x |=+ ⊥ for no x; x |=− ⊥ for all x
3. x |=+ ∼φ iff x |=− φ; x |=− ∼φ iff x |=+ φ
4. x |=+ φ∧ψ iff x |=+ φ and x |=+ ψ; x |=− φ∧ψ iff x |=− φ or x |=− ψ
5. x |=+ φ∨ψ iff x |=+ φ or x |=+ ψ; x |=− φ∨ψ iff x |=− φ and x |=− ψ
6. x |=+ φ → ψ iff x 6|=+ φ or x |=+ ψ; x |=− φ → ψ iff x |=+ φ and
x |=− ψ
7. x |=+ φ iff for all y, if Rxy, then y |=+ φ
x |=− φ iff there is y such that Rxy and y |=− φ
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8. x |=+ ♦φ iff there is y such that Rxy and y |=+ φ
x |=− ♦φ iff for all y, if Rxy, then y |=− φ
|φ|+M = {x | x |=
+
M φ} and |φ|
−
M = {x | x |=
−
M φ}. Entailment in the
resulting logic, BK, is defined as |=+-preservation in every state of every
model (X |=BK φ iff, for all M ,
⋂
ψ∈X |ψ|
+
M ⊆ |φ|
+
M ). Validity is defined as
usual (φ is valid in BK iff ∅ |=BK φ).
States x ∈ S can be seen as database-like bodies of information. The
fact that x |=+ φ can then be read as ‘x provides information that φ is true’
(or ‘x supports φ’, ‘x verifies φ’) and x |=− φ as ‘x provides information that
φ is false’ (‘x falsifies φ’). Consequently, |φ|+ is seen as the set of states in
which φ is true (the truth set of φ) and |φ|− as the set of states in which
φ is false (falsity set). Entailment then boils down to the usual notion of
truth-preservation. The distinguishing feature of the Belnap–Dunn picture
is that some bodies of information x may support conflicting information
about some φ (if x |=+ φ and x |=− φ) and some bodies of information
x may not provide any information about some φ at all (if x 6|=+ φ and
x 6|=− φ). In other words, |φ|+ and |φ|− may have a non-empty intersection
and their union is not necessarily identical to S.
The two negations ‘∼’ and ‘¬’ can be explained as follows. The formula
∼φ may be read as ‘φ is false’ (as x |=+ ∼φ iff x |=− φ). On the other
hand, the formula ¬φ is read as ‘φ is not true’ (note that x |=+ φ → ⊥ iff
x 6|=+ φ). In general, neither ∼φ → ¬φ nor ¬φ → ∼φ are valid. In other
words, the present framework treats ‘false’ and ‘not true’ as two independent
notions. The presence of ‘∼’ and ‘¬’ in our language allows to express the
four possible Belnapian truth values of a formula φ:
• φ ∧ ¬∼φ (φ is only true, i.e., true and not false);
• ¬φ ∧ ∼φ (φ is only false, i.e., not true and false);
• φ ∧∼φ (φ is both true and false);
• ¬φ ∧ ¬∼φ (φ is neither true nor false).
Theorem 2.2. The following axiom system, H(BK), is a sound and strongly
complete axiomatisation of BK:
1. Axioms of classical propositional logic in the language {AF,⊥,→,∧,∨}
and Modus ponens;
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2. Strong negation axioms:
∼∼φ↔ φ,
∼(φ ∧ ψ)↔ (∼φ ∨ ∼ψ),
∼(φ ∨ ψ)↔ (∼φ ∧ ∼ψ),
∼(φ→ ψ)↔ (φ ∧ ∼ψ),
⊤ ↔ ∼⊥;
3. The K axiom (φ → ψ) → (φ → ψ) and the Necessitation rule
φ/φ;
4. Modal interaction principles:
¬φ↔ ♦¬φ,
¬♦φ↔ ¬φ,
∼φ↔ ♦∼φ,
φ↔ ∼♦∼φ,
∼♦φ↔ ∼φ,
♦φ↔ ∼∼φ.
Proof. See [16].
The logic BK enjoys the deduction theorem in the sense that φ |= ψ iff
|= φ→ ψ.1 An interesting feature of BK is that the set of valid formulas is
not closed under the Replacement rule φ↔ ψ/χ(φ)↔ χ(ψ).2 However, it is
closed under the Positive replacement rule φ↔ ψ/γ(φ)↔ γ(ψ) for ∼-free γ
and the Weak replacement rule (φ ↔ ψ) ∧ (∼φ ↔ ∼ψ)/χ(φ) ↔ χ(ψ). (See
[16] for details.) Schemas (φ ∧ ∼φ) → ⊥ and φ ∨ ∼φ are not valid (but, of
course, (φ ∧ ¬φ)→ ⊥ and φ ∨ ¬φ both are).
Languages interpreted over bilattices often contain two additional binary
connectives ‘⊗’ and ‘⊕’. Their meaning can be outlined by the following
example using the reading of the four Belnapian truth values as subsets of
the set of ‘classical’ values {true, false}. If φ is only true and ψ is only false
(the value of φ is {true} and the value of ψ is {false}), then φ⊗ψ is neither
true nor false ({true} ∩ {false} = ∅) whereas φ ⊕ ψ is both true and false
1Proof: 6|= φ→ ψ iff, for some x, x 6|=+ φ→ ψ iff, for some x, x |=+ φ and x 6|=+ ψ iff
φ 6|= ψ.
2Note, for example, that ∼(φ→ ψ) ↔ (φ ∧ ∼ψ) is valid by the completeness theorem
but ∼∼(φ → ψ) ↔ ∼(φ ∧ ∼ψ) is not. The latter is provably equivalent to (φ → ψ) ↔
(∼φ ∨ ψ). Now consider a model where x 6|=+ p, x 6|=− p and x 6|=+ q. Then x |=+ p → q
but x 6|=+ ∼p ∨ q. By the deduction theorem, (p→ q)→ (∼p ∨ q) is not valid. It is easily
shown that the converse implication is not valid either.
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({true} ∪ {false} = {true, false}).3 Odintsov and Wansing [16] do not use
these connectives in the modal setting and, for the sake of simplicity, we
omit them as well. We note, however, that there is no technical obstacle
in introducing them to the framework and, speaking in terms of informal
interpretation, they fit in nicely also to our combination of BK with PDL.
Let us now return to the informal interpretation of BK. If states in the
model are seen as database-like bodies of information, then the accessibility
relation can be construed as any binary relation between such bodies of in-
formation. Interpretations related to transformations of such bodies (adding
or removing information, for example) are a natural choice. For instance,
with a set of available transformations in mind, we may read Rxy as ‘y is
the result of transforming x in some available way’. ♦φ then means that
there is an available transformation of the present body of information that
leads to φ being supported and φ means that all available transformations
lead to φ being supported. Hence, BK can be seen as a general formalism
for reasoning about such transformations.
This reading of R invites us to generalise the framework to a multi-modal
setting. We may want to distinguish between different types of transforma-
tion and so we may need Ri for each type i instead of a single relation R.
The corresponding formulas of a multi-modal extension of Lmod, iφ (♦iφ),
would then express that φ is supported after every (some) transformation
of type i. With a number of basic types at hand, the natural next step is to
introduce complex transformations consisting of transformations of the ba-
sic types. This brings us to extending BK with program operators provided
by PDL, i.e., choice, composition, iteration and test. Additional motivation
for considering a combination of PDL with BK is given by the following
examples.
Example 2.3. If Belnap–Dunn states are seen as bodies of information,
then state transitions (programs) may be seen as general inference rules.
Formulas of the combined language may express the nature and properties
of these rules. Introducing a Belnapian negation ∼ into the language ofPDL
opens the possibility of expressing inferences beyond the scope of classical
logic. Take, for example, default rules of the form
(1)
ψ : φ
χ
read ‘If ψ is true and there is no information that φ is false, then infer that
χ is true’. Such a default rule may be expressed by
(2) (ψ ∧ ¬∼φ)→ [α]χ,
3Closer to the present setting, φ ⊗ ψ is taken to be verified (falsified) iff both φ and
ψ are verified (falsified); and φ ⊕ ψ is verified (falsified) iff at least one of φ, ψ is verified
(falsified). (Hence, for example, extending BK with these connectives would result in
(φ⊗ψ)↔ (φ∧ψ) and (∼φ⊗∼ψ)↔ (∼φ∧∼ψ) being both valid, and similarly for ⊕ and
∨.)
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a formula that reads ‘If ψ is true and φ is not false, then every terminating
execution of α leads to a state where χ true’. If (2) holds in a state, then
executing the program α in the state is equivalent to using (1) in the state.
Hence, (1) and α are ‘locally equivalent’ in the given state. Moreover, if
[β∗] ((ψ ∧ ¬∼φ)→ [α]χ)
holds in a state, then (1) and α are ‘β-equivalent’, or locally equivalent in
every state reachable by a finite iteration of β.
Formulas of the form (2) may even be seen as defining α to be a coun-
terpart of a specific default rule. On this view, it is natural to focus only on
models where (2) holds in every state (is valid). This motivates a notion of
global consequence to be introduced below.
Example 2.4. A special case of (1) is the closed-world assumption rule
(3)
⊤ : ¬φ
∼φ
,
inferring that φ is false from the assumption that φ is not known to be true.
Applications of (3) correspond to executions of α in states where it is the
case that
¬φ→ [α]∼φ
Example 2.5. More generally, state transitions (programs) on Belnap–
Dunn states may be seen as arbitrary modifications of states. Program
α1 is locally equivalent to ‘marking φ as true’ and α2 to ‘marking ψ as false’
if
[α1]φ ∧ [α2]∼ψ
holds in the given state and similarly for β-equivalence. More interestingly,
the formula
(φ ∧ ∼φ) ∧ 〈α∗〉¬(φ ∧ ∼φ)
says that there is inconsistent information about φ in the present state, but
the inconsistency is removed after some finite number of executions of α. In
other words, α is a φ-inconsistency-removing modification.
Again, we may see the above formulas as defining the respective programs
to be counterparts of specific modifications of states.
3 BPDL
The language Ldyn is a variant of the language of PDL, containing two
kinds of expressions, namely, programs P and formulas F :
P α ::= a | α;α | α ∪ α | α∗ | φ?
F φ ::= p | ⊥ | ∼φ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | φ→ φ | [α]φ | 〈α〉φ
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(a ∈ AP , a countable set of atomic programs, and p ∈ AF ) ¬φ, ⊤ and
φ↔ ψ are defined as in Lmod.
Definition 3.1. A standard dynamic Odintsov–Wansing model is a tuple
M = 〈S,R, V +, V −〉, where S, V + and V − are as in Odintsov–Wansing
models. |=+M and |=
−
M are defined as before for {AF,⊥,∼,∧,∨,→}. R is
a function from P to binary relations on S such that R(α;β) (R(α ∪ β)) is
the composition (union) of R(α) and R(β); R(α∗) is the reflexive transitive
closure R(α)∗ of R(α); and R(φ?) is the identity relation on |φ|+. Moreover
(Rα is short for R(α)):
1. x |=+ [α]φ iff for all y, if Rαxy, then y |=
+ φ
2. x |=− [α]φ iff there is y such that Rαxy and y |=
− φ
3. x |=+ 〈α〉φ iff there is y such that Rαxy and y |=
+ φ
4. x |=− 〈α〉φ iff for all y, if Rαxy, then y |=
− φ
Entailment in BPDL is defined as |=+-preservation in every state of every
standard dynamic Odintsov–Wansing model. Validity in M and (logical)
validity |= φ are defined as usual. (M |= φ iff x |=+M φ for all states x ∈ S
of M; |= φ iffM |= φ for every standard dynamic Odintsov–Wansing model
M.) In addition to ‘local’ entailment, we define the global consequence
relation as follows: X |=g φ iff, for all M, if every ψ ∈ X is valid in M,
then so is φ.
A non-standard dynamic Odintsov–Wansing model is defined exactly as
a standard model, with one exception: R(α∗) is required to be a superset of
R(α)∗ (the converse inclusion is not assumed) such that
|[α∗]φ|+ = |φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ|+(4)
|[α∗]φ|+ ⊇ |φ ∧ [α∗](φ→ [α]φ)|+(5)
and
|〈α∗〉φ|+ = |φ ∨ 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ|+(6)
|〈α∗〉φ|+ ⊆ |φ ∨ 〈α∗〉(¬φ ∧ 〈α〉φ)|+(7)
In dynamic Odintsov–Wansing models, φ? tests whether φ is true. Hence,
test φ? executes successfully in two cases: if φ is only true and if φ is both
true and false. However, if a more precise assessment of φ is needed, one
can use (φ ∧ ¬∼φ)? and (φ ∧ ∼φ)?.
Lemma 3.2. All the H(BK) axiom schemata of Theorem 2.2, with all 
replaced by [α] and all ♦ replaced by 〈α〉, are valid in BPDL. Moreover,
the set of formulas valid in any (standard or non-standard) model is closed
under Modus ponens and the Necessitation rule φ/[α]φ.
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Lemma 3.3. The following schemata are valid in every (standard or non-
standard) model:
1. [α ∪ β]φ↔ ([α]φ ∧ [β]φ) and 〈α ∪ β〉φ↔ (〈α〉φ ∨ 〈β〉φ)
2. [α;β]φ ↔ [α][β]φ and 〈α;β〉φ↔ 〈α〉〈β〉φ
3. [ψ?]φ↔ (ψ → φ) and 〈ψ?〉φ↔ (ψ ∧ φ)
4. [α∗]φ↔ (φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ) and 〈α∗〉φ↔ (φ ∨ 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ)
5. (φ ∧ [α∗](φ→ [α]φ))→ [α∗]φ and 〈α∗〉φ→ (φ ∨ 〈α∗〉(¬φ ∧ 〈α〉φ))
Proof. The proofs are virtually identical to arguments used in the context of
standard PDL [15]. As an example, we show that [α∗]φ→ (φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ) is
valid. The validity of [α∗]φ→ φ follows from the fact that R(α∗) is reflexive.
Now if x 6|=+ [α][α∗ ]φ, then there are y, z such that R(α)xy, R(α∗)yz and
z 6|=+ φ. But obviously R(α∗)xz, so x 6|=+ [α∗]φ.
It is plain that compactness fails for BPDL for the same reason as for
PDL [15, 181]. Every finite subset of
M = {〈α∗〉φ} ∪ {¬φ} ∪ {¬〈αn〉φ | n ∈ ω}
is satisfiable, but M itself is not (αn = α; . . . ;α︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
).
Examples 2.3 – 2.5 suggest that some Ldyn-formulas can be seen as defini-
tions of specific features of programs (α represents a default rule, α removes
inconsistency in the information about a specific formula, etc.). Global con-
sequence is a natural notion here. If X is a set of such definitions, then
X |=g φ iff φ is valid in every model that respects the definitions ‘globally’.
In other words, φ is a consequence of the assumption that the definitions in
X are satisfied in every possible state. Similarly as in the case of PDL (see
[15, 209], global consequence for finite X corresponds to validity of specific
formulas.
Proposition 3.4. Let {a1, . . . , an} be the set of all atomic programs appear-
ing in some formula in (finite) X or in φ. Then
X |=g φ ⇐⇒ |= [(a1 ∪ . . . ∪ an)
∗]
∧
X → φ
Proof. The right-to-left implication is trivial. The converse implication is
established as follows. If [(a1∪. . .∪an)
∗]
∧
X → φ is not valid (the antecedent
of this implication is abbreviated as X∗), then there is a state x of a model
M such that x |=+ X∗ ∧ ¬φ. Define Mx by setting Sx = {y | 〈x, y〉 ∈
R((a1 ∪ . . . ∪ an)
∗)} and taking Rx, V
+
x and V
−
x to be restrictions of the
original R,V +, V − to Sx. It is plain that
∧
X is valid in Mx, but φ is not
(the key fact, easily established by induction on the complexity of α, is that
if every atomic program appearing in α is in {a1 ∪ . . . ∪ an}, then R(α)zz
′
only if Rx(α)zz
′, for all z, z′ ∈ Sx). Hence, X 6|=
g φ.
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4 Decidability
In this section we establish decidability of the satisfiability problem of Ldyn
formulas in (standard and non-standard) dynamic Odintsov–Wansing mod-
els. We modify the standard technique using filtration trough the Fischer–
Ladner closure of a formula. Our definition of the Fisher–Ladner closure is
a simplified version of the definition used in [15].
Definition 4.1. The Fisher-Ladner closure of φ, FL(φ), is the smallest set
of formulas such that
• φ ∈ FL(φ) and FL(φ) is closed under subformulas;
• if [ψ?]χ ∈ FL(φ), then ψ ∈ FL(φ);
• if [α ∪ β]χ ∈ FL(φ), then [α]χ ∈ FL(φ) and [β]χ ∈ FL(φ);
• if [α;β]χ ∈ FL(φ), then [α][β]χ ∈ FL(φ);
• if [α∗]χ ∈ FL(φ), then [α][α∗]χ ∈ FL(φ);
• variants of the above conditions with all ‘[·]’ replaced by ‘〈·〉’.
Lemma 4.2. For all φ, FL(φ) is finite.
Proof. Standard argument, see [14].
Definition 4.3. Let T be a set of formulas and M a (standard or non-
standard) model with x, y ∈ S. Let x ≡T y iff, for all φ ∈ T ,
x |=+M φ ⇐⇒ y |=
+
M φ
x |=−M φ ⇐⇒ y |=
−
M φ.
Let [x]T = {y | x ≡T y}. The filtration ofM trough T isMT = 〈ST , RT , V
+
T , V
−
T 〉,
where
1. ST = {[x]T | x ∈ S};
2. RT (a) = {〈[x]T , [y]T 〉 | Raxy} for all a ∈ AP ;
3. V +T (p) = {[x]T | x ∈ V
+(p)};
4. V −T (p) = {[x]T | x ∈ V
−(p)}.
Relations |=+MT , |=
−
MT
and RT (α) for complex α are defined as in standard
models.
It is plain thatMT is a standard model. We write [x] instead of [x]T if T is
clear from the context.
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Lemma 4.4. For all MT , |ST | ≤ 4
|T |.
Proof. There are four possible truth values of each member of T .
Lemma 4.5 (Filtration Lemma). Let M be a (standard or non-standard)
model and φ a formula.
1. If [α]ψ ∈ FL(φ) or 〈α〉ψ ∈ FL(φ), then R(α)xy only if RFL(φ)(α)[x][y];
2. If [α]ψ ∈ FL(φ), then RFL(φ)(α)[x][y] and x |=
+ [α]ψ only if y |=+ ψ;
3. If 〈α〉ψ ∈ FL(φ), then RFL(φ)(α)[x][y] and y |=
+ ψ only if x |=+ 〈α〉ψ;
4. If 〈α〉ψ ∈ FL(φ), then RFL(φ)(α)[x][y] and x |=
− 〈α〉ψ only if y |=− ψ;
5. If [α]ψ ∈ FL(φ), then RFL(φ)(α)[x][y] and y |=
− ψ only if x |=− [α]ψ;
6. If ψ ∈ FL(φ), then x |=+ ψ iff [x] |=+ ψ;
7. If ψ ∈ FL(φ), then x |=− ψ iff [x] |=− ψ.
Proof. A simple but tedious variation of the standard proof using simulta-
neous induction on the subexpression relation [14, 15]. Details of some of
the steps are given in Appendix A.
Theorem 4.6. The satisfiability problem for BPDL is decidable.
Proof. Standard argument. If φ is satisfiable in some M, then, by Lemmas
4.4 and 4.5(vi), φ is satisfiable in a standard model of size at most 4k where
k = |FL(φ)|. There is a finite number of such models, so a naive satisfiability
algorithm is to determine k = |FL(φ)| and check all models of size 4k.
5 Completeness
The axiom system H(BPDL) results from H(BK) by replacing all ‘’ by
‘[α]’ and all ‘♦’ by ‘〈α〉’ and adding the schemata explicitly stated in Lemma
3.3. (See Appendix B.) The notion of a maximal H(BPDL)-consistent set
(m.c. set) of formulas is defined as usual (X is consistent iff ¬
∧
X ′ is not
provable for all finite X ′ ⊆ X; X is m.c. iff X is consistent all X ′ ⊃ X are
inconsistent). Hence, m.c. sets have all the usual properties.
Definition 5.1. The canonical model Mc = 〈Sc, Rc, V
+
c , V
−
c 〉 is a quadruple
such that
1. Sc is the set of all m.c. sets;
2. Rc(α)XY iff for all [α]φ ∈ X, φ ∈ Y (iff for all φ ∈ Y , 〈α〉φ ∈ X);
3. V +c (p) = {X | p ∈ X};
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4. V −c (p) = {X | ∼p ∈ X};
|φ|+c = {X | φ ∈ X} and |φ|
−
c = {X | ∼φ ∈ X}.
Lemma 5.2. |φ|+c and |φ|
−
c behave like |φ|
+ and |φ|− (in standard and non-
standard models), respectively:
• X ∈ |p|+c iff X ∈ V
+
c (p); X ∈ |p|
−
c iff X ∈ V
−
c (p);
• |⊥|+c = ∅; |⊥|
−
c = Sc;
• |∼φ|+c = |φ|
−
c ; |∼φ|
−
c = |φ|
+
c ;
• |φ ∧ ψ|+c = |φ|
+
c ∩ |ψ|
+
c ; |φ ∧ ψ|
−
c = |φ|
−
c ∪ |ψ|
−
c ;
• |φ ∨ ψ|+c = |φ|
+
c ∪ |ψ|
+
c ; |φ ∧ ψ|
−
c = |φ|
−
c ∩ |ψ|
−
c ;
• |φ→ ψ|+c = (Sc − |φ|
+
c ) ∪ |ψ|
+
c ; |φ→ ψ|
−
c = |φ|
+
c ∩ |ψ|
−
c ;
• |[α]φ|+c = {X | (∀Y )(if Rc(α)XY, then Y ∈ |φ|
+
c )};
|[α]φ|−c = {X | (∃Y )(Rc(α)XY and Y ∈ |φ|
−
c )};
• |〈α〉φ|+c = {X | (∃Y )(Rc(α)XY and Y ∈ |φ|
+
c )};
|〈α〉φ|−c = {X | (∀Y )(if Rc(α)XY, then Y ∈ |φ|
−
c )}.
Proof. Standard inductive argument, we state only three cases explicitly.
Firstly, |∼φ|−c = {X | ∼∼φ ∈ X} and, as φ ↔ ∼∼φ is an axiom, this set is
identical to {X | φ ∈ X}, i.e., to |φ|+c .
Secondly, |[α]φ|+ = {X | [α]φ ∈ X}. We have to show that [α]φ ∈ X
iff for all Y , Rc(α)XY only if Y ∈ |φ|
+. The left-to-right implication is
trivial. The right-to-left implication is established by the following standard
argument. Assume that ¬[α]φ ∈ X. We want to show that there is Y such
that Rc(α)XY and ¬φ ∈ Y . We claim that the set
(8) M = {¬φ} ∪ {ψ | [α]ψ ∈ X}
is consistent. (We denote {ψ | [α]ψ ∈ X} as X−α.) To see this, take
an arbitrary finite Ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψm} ⊆ X
−α. It is plain that 〈α〉¬φ ∧
[α]ψ1 ∧ . . . ∧ [α]ψm ∈ X. Hence, by the K-style properties of [α] and 〈α〉,
〈α〉(¬φ∧ψ1∧ . . .∧ψm) ∈ X. By the Necessitation rule, ¬(¬φ∧ψ1∧ . . .∧ψm)
is not provable, so {¬φ,ψ1, . . . , ψm} is consistent. But Ψ was chosen as an
arbitrary finite subset of X−α. Consequently, {¬φ} ∪ Ψ′ for every finite
Ψ′ ⊆ X−α can be shown to be consistent in this way. Hence, M itself is
consistent. By the Lindenbaum Lemma, M can be extended to a m.c. Y
and it is plain that Rc(α)XY and ¬φ ∈ Y .
Thirdly, |[α]φ|−c = {X | ∼[α]φ ∈ X}, a set identical to {X | 〈α〉∼φ ∈
X} as ∼[α]φ ↔ 〈α〉∼φ is an axiom. A straightforward adaptation of the
argument given by [15, p. 206] shows that this set is identical to {X |
(∃Y )(Rc(α)XY and Y ∈ |φ|
−
c )}.
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Lemma 5.3. Mc is a non-standard model.
Proof. We need to be establish that R satisfies the conditions required by
the definition of a non-standard model. The argument for ∪, ;, ? and the
iteration equations (4) – (7) is virtually identical to that given by [15, p.206–
8]. To show that Rc(α)
∗ ⊆ Rc(α
∗), assume that 〈X,Y 〉 ∈ Rc(α)
∗ but
〈X,Y 〉 6∈ Rc(α
∗). Hence, there is φ such that [α∗]φ ∈ X but φ 6∈ Y .
However, 〈X,Y 〉 ∈ Rc(α)
∗ implies that either X = Y or else there are
Z0, . . . , Zm such that Z0 = X, Zm = Y and 〈Zk, Zk+1〉 ∈ Rc(α) for 1 ≤
k < m. In the former case, φ ∈ Y by the axiom [α∗]φ ↔ (φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ),
a contradiction. In the latter case, [α∗]φ ∈ Zk entails [α][α
∗]φ ∈ Zk+1 by
the same axiom for all 1 ≤ k < n and, hence, [α∗]φ ∈ Y . Hence, φ ∈ Y , a
contradiction.
Since BPDL is not compact, it cannot enjoy a strongly complete ax-
iomatisation (as BK does). However, weak completeness is another story.
Theorem 5.4. φ is provable in H(BPDL) iff φ is valid in BPDL.
Proof. Soundness follows from Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3. Completeness follows
from Lemmas 4.5 and 5.3. If φ is not provable, then X ∈ |¬φ|+c for some
m.c. set X. By the Filtration Lemma, (Mc)FL(¬φ) is a standard model such
that [X] ∈ |¬φ|+
FL(¬φ).
6 Conclusion
This article introduced BPDL, a combination of propositional dynamic
logic PDL with the four-valued Belnapian modal logic BK. The logic is
expected to be useful in formalising reasoning about the properties of algo-
rithmic transformations of possibly incomplete and inconsistent database-
like bodies of information. We modified the standard proofs based on filtra-
tion and the canonical-model technique and, as the main technical results of
the article, established decidability of BPDL and provided it with a sound
and weakly complete axiomatisation. The main message here is that the
standard techniques are easily adapted to the four-valued setting.
The number one topic for future research is the complexity of the satis-
fiability problem for BPDL. The problem is EXPTIME-complete for PDL
and it will be interesting to see whether the situation gets worse in the
case of BPDL. Our strategy of tackling the problem will be, as for the
results already achieved, to try to adapt the proof technique used in the
case of PDL to the four-valued setting. We shall also investigate Belnapian
versions of some extensions of PDL. The obvious choice is the first-order
dynamic logic DL, but also concurrent PDL modelling parallel execution
of programs. Last but not least, a more thorough examination of possible
applications of BPDL will be an interesting enterprise.
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A Proof of the Filtration Lemma
The proof is a variation of the standard proof using simultaneous induction
on the subexpression (subformula or subprogram) relation [14, 15]. In prov-
ing the claim of any item (i)–(vii) for any special case of α or ψ, we assume
that all the items hold for all subexpressions of α and ψ. Only some steps
of the proof are explicitly stated here (and, perhaps, in more detail than an
expert reader needs).
A.1 M is a standard model
(i), α = β∗. If R(β∗)xy, then, since R(β∗) is the reflexive transitive closure
of R(β), there are z0, . . . , zn such that z0 = x, zn = y and either n = 0
or else R(β)zizi+1 for 0 ≤ i < n. If n = 0, then RFL(φ)(β
∗)[z0][zn] by the
definition of RFL(φ)(β
∗). Assume n > 0. If [β∗]ψ (〈β∗〉) is in FL(φ), then so
is [β][β∗]ψ (〈β〉〈β∗〉ψ). β is a subexpression of β∗, so, in both cases, we may
apply the induction hypothesis (IH): R(β)zizi+1 implies RFL(φ)(β)[zi][zi+1]
for 0 ≤ i < n. Hence, RFL(φ)(β
∗)[z0][zn] by the definition of RFL(φ).
(i), α = χ?. If R(χ?)xy, then x = y and x |=+ χ. If [χ?]ψ (〈χ?〉ψ) is in
FL(φ), then so is χ. χ is a subexpression of [χ?]ψ (〈χ?〉ψ) and a formula,
so we may apply the IH of (vi): x |=+ χ entails [x] |=+ χ. But [x] = [y] and,
hence, RFL(φ)(χ?)[x][y] by the definition of RFL(φ).
(ii), α = β∗. If RFL(φ)(β
∗)[x][y], then there are z0, . . . , zn such that
[z0] = [x], [zn] = [y] and either n = 0 or else RFL(φ)(β)[zi][zi+1] for 0 ≤ i < n.
If n = 0, then x |=+ [β∗]ψ entails y |=+ ψ by the assumption [β∗]ψ ∈ FL(φ)
and Lemma 3.3(iv). Assume n > 0. We prove that
(9) x |=+ [β∗]ψ =⇒ zk |=
+ [β∗]ψ (0 ≤ k ≤ n)
by induction on k. If k = 0, then the claim follows from the assumption
[β∗]ψ ∈ FL(φ). Assume that the claim holds for k = l. We prove that
it holds for k = l + 1 as well. The assumption is that x |=+ [β∗]ψ entails
zl |=
+ [β∗]ψ. By Lemma 3.3(iv), zl |= [β][β
∗]ψ. β is a subexpression of
β∗ and [β][β∗]ψ ∈ FL(φ), so we may use IH of item (ii) of the Filtration
Lemma: RFL(φ)(β)[zk][zl+1] entails zl+1 |=
+ [β∗]ψ. This proves (9). Now
x |=+ [β∗]ψ entails zn |= [β
∗]ψ by (9) and zn |= [β
∗]ψ entails zn |=
+ ψ by
Lemma 3.3(iv). But [zn] = [y] and ψ ∈ FL(φ), so y |=
+ ψ.
(iv), α = β∗. If RFL(φ)(β
∗)[x][y], then there are z0, . . . , zn such that
[z0] = [x], [zn] = [y] and either n = 0 or else RFL(φ)(β)[zi][zi+1] for 0 ≤
i < n. If n = 0, then x |=− 〈β∗〉ψ entails y |=− 〈β∗〉ψ by the assumption
〈β∗〉ψ ∈ FL(φ). Hence, y |=+ [β∗]∼ψ by Lemma 3.2. By Lemma 3.3(iv),
y |=+ ∼ψ. Hence, y |=− ψ. Next, assume that n > 0. We prove that
(10) x |=− 〈β∗〉ψ =⇒ zk |=
− 〈β∗〉ψ (0 ≤ k ≤ n)
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by induction on k. If k = 0, then the claim follows from the assumption
〈β∗〉ψ ∈ FL(φ). Assume that the claim holds for k = l. We prove that it
holds for k = l+1 as well. The assumption is that x |=− 〈β∗〉ψ entails zl |=
−
〈β∗〉ψ. By Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3(iv), zl |=
− 〈β〉〈β∗〉ψ. β is a subexpression
of β∗, so we may use the IH to infer zl+1 |=
− 〈β∗〉ψ. This proves (10).
Assume that x |=− 〈β∗〉ψ. By (10), zn |=− β∗〉ψ. By the assumption that
〈β∗〉ψ ∈ FL(φ), y |=− β∗〉ψ. By Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3(iv), y |=− ψ.
(v), α = β∗. If RFL(φ)(β
∗)[x][y], then there are z0, . . . , zn such that
[z0] = [x], [zn] = [y] and either n = 0 or else RFL(φ)(β)[zi][zi+1] for 0 ≤ i < n.
If n = 0, then the reasoning is similar as in the above cases. Hence, assume
that n > 0. We prove that
(11) zn |=
− ψ =⇒ zn−k |=
− [β∗]ψ (0 ≤ k ≤ n)
by induction on k. The case k = 0is trivial. Assume that the claim holds
for k = l. We prove that it holds for k = l + 1 as well. The assumption
is that zn |=
− ψ entails zn−l |=
− [β∗]ψ. There are two possibilities. Either
(a) zn−l |=
− ψ or (b) zn−l |=
− [β][β∗]ψ. If (a), then zn−(l+1) |=
− [β]ψ by
IH and zn−(l+1) |=
− [β∗]ψ by Rβ ⊆ (Rβ)
∗. If (b), then IH entails that
zn−(l+1) |=
− [β][β][β∗ ]ψ. By Rβ ⊆ (Rβ)
∗, zn−(l+1) |=
− [β∗]ψ. This proves
(11). Now y |=− ψ only if zn |=
− ψ (ψ ∈ FL(φ)) only if z0 |=
− [β∗]ψ (11)
only if x |=− [β∗]ψ ([β∗]ψ ∈ FL(φ)).
(vi), ψ = ∼χ. x |=+ ∼χ iff x |=− χ. χ is a subexpression of ∼χ, so we
may use IH of (vii): and infer x |=− χ iff [x] |=− χ iff [x] |=+ ∼χ (by the
definition of |=+MFL(φ) . In fact, this case requires to introduce item (vii) into
the Filtration Lemma.
(vi), ψ = [α]χ. Assume [α]χ ∈ FL(φ). Then χ ∈ FL(φ). To prove the
left-to-right implication, assume that x |=+ [α]χ and RFL(φ)(α)[x][y]. α is
a subexpression of [α]χ, so we may use IH of (ii) to infer y |=+ χ. By IH,
[y] |=+ χ. To prove the right-to-left implication, assume that [x] |=+ [α]χ
and Rαxy. IH of (i) implies that RFL(φ)(α)[x][y]. Consequently, [y] |=
+ χ
and, by IH, y |=+ χ.
(vi), ψ = 〈α〉χ. We prove only the right-to-left implication. If [x] |=+
〈α〉χ, then there is y such thatRFL(φ)(α)[x][y] and [y] |=
+ χ. By IH, y |=+ χ.
By IH of (iii), x |=+ 〈α〉χ. This was the reason we had to include item (iii)
of the Lemma.
(vii), ψ = p. Let p ∈ FL(φ). The left-to-right implication is trivial. To
prove the converse, assume that [x] |=− p. This means that there is x′ ≡ x
such that x′ |=− p. By the definition of filtration, x |=− p as well. Note that
to prove this implication it was necessary to define ≡ in terms of both |=+
and |=−.
(vii), ψ = [α]χ. We prove only the right-to-left implication. If [x] |=−
[α]χ, then there is y such that RFL(φ)(α)[x][y] and [y] |=
− χ. By IH of (v),
y |=− [α]χ. This case required to introduce item (v).
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(vii), ψ = 〈α〉χ. We prove only the left-to-right implication. Assume
x |=− 〈α〉χ and RFL(φ)(α)[x][y]. By IH of (iv), y |=
− χ. By IH, [y] |=− χ.
Hence, [x] |=− 〈α〉χ. This case required to introduce item (iv) of the Lemma.
Proofs of other cases are similar or standard.
A.2 M is a non-standard model
As in the standard proof for this case, the only claim where the assumption
Rα∗ = (Rα)
∗ was used is (i), α = β∗. Hence, we have to prove that if
[β∗]ψ ∈ FL(φ) or 〈β∗〉ψ ∈ FL(φ), then R(β∗)xy only if RFL(φ)(β
∗)[x][y].
Our argument is very close to the one given in [15, sec. 6.3].
Assume that 〈x, y〉 ∈ R(β∗). We want to show that 〈[x], [y]〉 ∈ RFL(φ)(β
∗),
or equivalently that y ∈ E, where
E = {z | 〈[x], [z]〉 ∈ RFL(φ)(β
∗)}
Recall that [·] is given by some specific finite setFL(φ) of formulas. For
any [z]FL(φ), define X[z] to be the smallest set of formulas such that, for all
χ ∈ FL(φ):
• If z |=+ χ, then χ ∈ X[z];
• If z 6|=+ χ, then ¬χ ∈ X[z].
(Note that we are using ‘¬’ not ‘∼’.) Obviously, X[z] is finite for all z. Define
ψ[z] =
∧
X[z]
It is not hard to show that, for all w ∈ S,
(12) w |=+ ψ[z] ⇐⇒ w ≡ z
(For instance, assume that w 6≡ z because there is θ ∈ FL(φ) such that
w |=− θ and z 6|=− θ. But then z 6|=+ ∼θ and, consequently, ¬∼θ ∈ X[z].
But then w 6|=+ ψ[z] because w |=
+ ∼θ.) Now define
ψE =
∨
z∈E
ψ[z]
It is not hard to show that ψE defines E, i.e., for all w ∈ S
(13) w ∈ E ⇐⇒ w |=+ ψE
(For instance, assume that w ∈ E but w 6|=+ ψE . Then w 6|=
+ ψ[z] for all
z ∈ E. In particular, w 6|=+ ψ[w]. (12) entails that this is impossible.)
It is easy to show that E is closed under Rβ , i.e., for all z, z
′,
(14) z ∈ E & Rβzz
′ =⇒ z′ ∈ E
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(β is a subexpression of β∗, so Rβzz
′ entails RFL(φ)(β)[z][z
′ ] by IH. By
the definition of E, z ∈ E means that RFL(φ)(β
∗)[x][z]. Consequently,
RFL(φ)(β
∗)[x][z′]. In other words, z′ ∈ E.) (14) means that ψE → [β]ψE is
valid in M. By Lemma 3.2(Nec. rule), so is [β∗] (ψE → [β]ψE). By Lemma
3.3(v), the induction axiom (φ ∧ [α∗](φ→ [α]φ))→ [α∗]φ is also valid inM.
It is also easy to show that x ∈ E (R(β∗) is a superset of the reflexive
transitive closure of R(β), so it contains the identity relation of SFL(φ).)
Hence, x |=+ ψE ∧ [β
∗] (ψE → [β]ψE). By the validity of the induction
axiom in M, x |=+ [β∗]ψE . Hence, if R(β
∗)xy, then y |=+ ψE . By (13),
y ∈ E.
B The axiom system H(BPDL)
1. Axioms of classical propositional logic in the language {AF,⊥,→,∧,∨}
and Modus ponens;
2. Strong negation axioms:
∼∼φ↔ φ,
∼(φ ∧ ψ)↔ (∼φ ∨ ∼ψ),
∼(φ ∨ ψ)↔ (∼φ ∧ ∼ψ),
∼(φ→ ψ)↔ (φ ∧ ∼ψ),
⊤ ↔ ∼⊥;
3. Modal axiom [α](φ → ψ)→ ([α]φ → [α]ψ) and the Necessitation rule
φ/[α]φ;
4. PDL axiom schemata
[α ∪ β]φ↔ ([α]φ ∧ [β]φ) and 〈α ∪ β〉φ↔ (〈α〉φ ∨ 〈β〉φ) ,
[α;β]φ ↔ [α][β]φ and 〈α;β〉φ↔ 〈α〉〈β〉φ,
[ψ?]φ↔ (ψ → φ) and 〈ψ?〉φ↔ (ψ ∧ φ) ,
[α∗]φ↔ (φ ∧ [α][α∗]φ) and 〈α∗〉φ↔ (φ ∨ 〈α〉〈α∗〉φ) ,
(φ ∧ [α∗](φ→ [α]φ))→ [α∗]φ and 〈α∗〉φ→ (φ ∨ 〈α∗〉(¬φ ∧ 〈α〉φ)) ;
5. Modal interaction principles:
¬[α]φ↔ 〈α〉¬φ,
¬〈α〉φ↔ [α]¬φ,
∼[α]φ↔ 〈α〉∼φ,
[α]φ↔ ∼〈α〉∼φ,
∼〈α〉φ↔ [α]∼φ,
〈α〉φ↔ ∼[α]∼φ.
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